

Cryptography - Provable Security

SS 2017

Handout 8

Exercise 1:

Let $MAC = (\text{Gen}, \text{Mac}, \text{Vrfy})$ be a MAC and for $k \in \{0, 1\}^n$ the tag generation algorithm Mac_k always outputs tags of length $t(n)$. Prove that if $t(n) = \mathcal{O}(\log(n))$ then MAC cannot be a secure MAC.

Exercise 2:

Let $F : \{0, 1\}^n \times \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ be a pseudorandom function. Show that the following MACs are insecure. For all the schemes the key $k \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ is chosen uniformly at random.

- a) To authenticate a message $m_1 || m_2$ with $|m_1| = |m_2| = n - 1$, compute the tag

$$t := F_k(0 || m_1) || F_k(1 || m_2).$$

- b) To authenticate a message $m_1 || m_2$ with $|m_1| = |m_2| = n$, compute the tag

$$t := F_k(m_1) || F_k(F_k(m_2)).$$

- c) To authenticate a message $m_1 || m_2 || \dots || m_\ell$ with $|m_i| = n$, compute the tag

$$t := F_k(m_1) || F_k(m_2) || \dots || F_k(m_\ell).$$

- d) To authenticate a message $m = m_1 || m_2 || \dots || m_\ell$ with $|m_i| = n - \log(n)$, choose $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^n$ uniformly at random and compute the tag

$$t := \langle r, F_k(r) \oplus F_k(\langle 1 \rangle || m_1) \oplus \dots \oplus F_k(\langle \ell \rangle || m_\ell) \rangle,$$

where $\langle i \rangle$ is the $\log(n)$ bit encoding of integer i .

Note that the following MAC is secure: To authenticate $m = m_1 || \dots || m_\ell$ with $|m_i| = n$ set $k_\ell := F_k(\langle \ell \rangle)$, $t_0 := 0^n$, for $i = 1, \dots, \ell$ compute $t_i := F_{k_\ell}(t_{i-1} \oplus m_i)$ and output tag $t := t_\ell$. Compare the secure construction to the insecure constructions as well as to Constructions 8.4 and 8.6 from the lecture.

Exercise 3:

Let $MAC = (\text{Gen}', \text{Mac}', \text{Vrfy}')$ be a secure fixed-length MAC for messages of length n . Assume for simplicity that Gen' chooses a random n -bit key uniformly at random. Break the message $m = m_1 || \dots || m_\ell$ into ℓ blocks in an appropriate way. Consider the following MAC schemes:

- $\text{Mac}_k(m) = \langle \text{Mac}'_k(m_1), \dots, \text{Mac}'_k(m_\ell) \rangle$

- $\text{Mac}_k(m) = \langle \text{Mac}'_k(\langle 1 \rangle, m_1), \dots, \text{Mac}'_k(\langle \ell \rangle, m_\ell) \rangle$, where $\langle i \rangle$ denotes the binary representation of i of length $n/2$.
- $r \leftarrow \{0, 1\}^{n/3}$, $\text{Mac}_k(m) = \langle r, \text{Mac}'_k(\langle r \rangle, \langle 1 \rangle, m_1), \dots, \text{Mac}'_k(\langle r \rangle, \langle \ell \rangle, m_\ell) \rangle$, where $\langle i \rangle$ denotes the binary representation of i of length $n/3$.

Compare the schemes to Construction 8.6 from the lecture. What kind of attacks are possible against the introduced schemes and what kind of attacks are prevented?