Abstract:
The Great Firewall of China restricts the internet to its citizens using nation-state censorship middleboxes. There is growing evidence that other countries are not only following the example of China, but are also obtaining censorship infrastructure from China. In this work, we measure if and compare how DNS censorship is implemented in Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Myanmar, and Pakistan. We investigate the claim that these countries deploy the leaked middlebox Tiangou Secure Gateway of the Chinese company Geedge Networks. We analyze the middlebox and compare its parsing behavior to the nation-state deployed censors by probing manipulated DNS request vectors. We find that censors deployed in Kazakhstan, Myanmar, and Pakistan differ from the leaked commercial censor in DNS message parsing behavior, whereas the Chinese Great Firewall shows a similar parsing behavior. These findings indicate that while China’s domestic censors align closely with its commercial exports, the global censorship landscape for DNS is shaped by individual censor implementations.